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1THE WORK OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION IN
ENFORCING VOTING RIGHTS UNDER THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTS OF 1957 AND 1960*
JOHN DOAR**
In 1957 Congress created the Civil Rights Division (Division) as
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1957.1 During the first two and one-
half years of its life, the Division moved slowly. As late as February
1960 the Division had not yet begun to act effectively to bar racial
discrimination in voting.
In 1960 the Division faced extraordinary obstacles. Distinguished
constitutional lawyers believed that, under the Constitution, the
federal government had no power to regulate voter qualifications.
According to these scholars, voter qualifications were the exclusive
domain of the separate states. Each state was entitled to make an
independent determination as to how literate or intelligent its
citizens must be before being allowed to participate in local, state,
and national elections. Because of this uncertainty, the U.S.
Attorney General, William Rogers, decided that the Division should
proceed cautiously until the Supreme Court decided the extent of
federal authority over voting.
Still, there was much that needed to be done. While Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama do not comprise much of the United
States, the size of these states is considerable. Shreveport, at the
Texas border of Louisiana, is 500 miles west of the Alabama-Georgia
border. Memphis, Tennessee, is 400 miles north of New Orleans.
Each of the states had its own laws respecting voter qualifications.
In each state, registration procedures and practices were different.
Each had peculiar application forms.
Local county or parish officials administered the state
registration laws. There were some 160 counties or parishes within
the states, and most needed to have their practices investigated to
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determine whether a pattern of racial discrimination in voting
existed.
Besides the uncertain state of the law, and the size of the area
where enforcement was required, there was another problem. In
1960 the Division was small—very small. It consisted of about fifteen
lawyers who, as if the Division did not have enough to do, had been
assigned criminal2 and civil jurisdiction3 over election fraud and
federal custody matters.
Fortunately, the Division was not without resources. Among its
lawyers were two remarkable men. St. John Barrett4 was the
Division’s second assistant. Harold Greene5 was the head of the
Division’s Appeals and Research Section. Four young lawyers were
apprentices to Barrett and Greene: Dave Norman,6 Bob Owen,7
Frank Dunbaugh,8 and Nick Flannery.9 Norman and Owen were
among the first of the Department of Justice’s honor recruits. They
brought complementary abilities to the Division. A large amount of
the credit for the development of the government’s strategy in
enforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1957 belongs to Norman, and the
credit for implementing that strategy with skill, energy, and style
belongs to Owen.
These lawyers quickly demonstrated their talent. In early 1961,
Judge Frank Johnson of the Middle District of Alabama set the
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government’s Macon County, Alabama, racial discrimination voting
case down for trial. In a matter of days, the team of Owen, Norman,
and Dunbaugh had prepared the case. Following a trial, Judge
Johnson accepted the suggestion of the Division that later became
known as freezing relief.10 He ordered the Board of Registrars to
register applicants who met the qualification of the least qualified
white on the voting rolls.11 Since the Division had proved there was
universal white suffrage in Macon County, Alabama, the only
qualification for voting in Macon County under Judge Johnson’s
order was age and residence.12
When Robert Kennedy arrived as the U.S. Attorney General, he
was determined to make a mark for the new administration in
enforcing the Civil Rights Acts. He selected Burke Marshall13 to head
the Division. Throughout his tenure, Marshall directed and honed
the Division’s enforcement strategy as it was being developed by
Barrett, Greene, Norman, and Owen.
Shortly thereafter, we were called to the Attorney General’s office
to outline the Division’s strategy in enforcing the Civil Rights Acts of
1957 and 1960.14  Kennedy went directly to the point by asking how
we were going to get something accomplished in Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama. We explained that there were seven
judicial districts within the three states, and the Division’s strategy
was to develop and file a case of voter discrimination against a
registrar in one county in each of the judicial districts in the three
states.
We had brought a detailed map of the southern part of the United
States with us. “Too slow,” said the Attorney General. “It won’t do.
You’ve got to do more.” He sized up the number of counties in
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. He wanted pins on the map,
suits filed in every county where there were under-registrations of
black people, and he wanted this accomplished “the day before
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yesterday.” Burke Marshall said, “Well, General, we’re going to need
more lawyers.” The Attorney General asked, “How many?” Burke
said, “Four.” Without argument or delay, the Division got four,
maybe six newly created positions. Bud Sather, Gerald Stern, John
Martin, Gordon Martin, Dick Parsons, and Jim Groh were hired.
Marshall said we would need the assistance of the FBI. At the
time, the FBI had 5600 agents. Theoretically, support from the FBI
should have increased the Division’s capability. However, before the
Division could make use of the Bureau, the Division first had to
learn how to carry out the assignment. Division lawyers had to
master everything that goes into understanding the realities of a
distant and unknown territory: the back roads; the operations of
county registrar’s offices; the states’ registration laws; 100 years of
history; the identity of the local leaders; the way the court’s family in
each judicial district functioned—the clerk, the judge’s secretary, the
marshals, the U.S. Attorney, the court reporter—you name it.
I can still recall how the Division operated during the 1961-1963
time period. On a Friday afternoon I would see a row of suitcases
and briefcases lined up in the first floor corridor of the Department
of Justice, alongside the offices of the Division lawyers. Whenever
lawyers went south to investigate, they departed Washington on
Friday night to return on the third Sunday following. This meant
sixteen straight days in the field. Travel past Atlanta was on a DC-3
with local stops at Montgomery, Meridian, Jackson, Monroe, and
Shreveport. At each of these airports, two or more lawyers from the
Division would leave the plane and move out into the field to learn
more and more about the particular counties to which they had been
assigned.
As the Division lawyers criss-crossed the rural roads of Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama, they found a complex legal and social
network designed to protect and preserve the caste system. The
scheme was not haphazard. A means used was official corruption
and official and unofficial intimidation in connection with voting.
They also saw that Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama remained
largely a part of the American frontier, the rural white society
riddled throughout with bewildering patterns of suspicion and
silence.
So the Division began, county by county, a case-by-case assault on
the caste system. Suits were quickly filed in East Carroll, Ouchita,
and Madison parishes in Louisiana; in Forest, Clark, Jefferson
Davis, Walthall, Tallahatchee, and Panola counties in Mississippi;
and in Bullock, Dallas, and Montgomery counties in Alabama.
I have often wondered how the Division could have gone about its
assignment with such enthusiasm. For a long time I attributed much
of it to youth, to what Joseph Conrad calls that moment of strength,
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of romance, of glamour—of youth. Now I think I’ve found the answer.
The spirit of the Division lawyers assigned to enforce the Civil
Rights Acts was governed by what President Havel of
Czechoslovakia calls a philosophy grounded in hope. This kind of
hope is not the same as optimism. It is not a willingness to invest in
an enterprise that is obviously heralded for early success, but rather
the ability to work hard for something because it makes sense, not
because it stands a chance to succeed.
Once our suits were filed we ran into trouble. There were no
District judges other than Judge Johnson on the District benches in
the judicial districts of Louisiana, Mississippi, or Alabama.
At the same time, other forces had begun to work. In the summer
of 1961, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)
undertook a voter registration project in Mississippi. Bob Moses was
placed in charge. SNCC decided to work in the counties along the
Louisiana border in southwest Mississippi. These counties,
Wilkinson, Amite, Pike, and Walthall, were rural, out of the way
places. To go into those counties was like going back into the
nineteenth century.
As soon as Bob Moses opened his voter registration school, he
began to bring black citizens to the circuit clerk and registrar’s office
to register. He immediately ran into serious trouble. Moses and
other SNCC workers were threatened, attacked, and, after reporting
their experiences to the high sheriff, arrested. Earlier, in late 1960
and early 1961, the Division had achieved some success in checking
economic intimidation against sharecroppers who tried to register to
vote in Haywood and Fayette counties, Tennessee, and in helping a
farmer who could not get his cotton ginned in East Carroll Parish,
Louisiana. But control of violence in the states of Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama was a different matter.
At first, the Division confronted this hostile local law enforcement
in southwest Mississippi. Sather and Stern were sent to southwest
Mississippi to interview witnesses. They returned with their
notebooks full of information that reflected serious violations of the
federal laws we were bound to enforce. The Division moved
immediately before Judge Harold Cox, Chief Judge of the United
States Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, to enjoin a
state criminal prosecution of John Hardy, who had accompanied a
young black woman, Ruby McGee, to the registrar’s office to register.
As he was leaving his office, the registrar hit Hardy on the head with
a pistol. Hardy sought the high sheriff to complain. At the same
time, the high sheriff  was looking for Hardy. They met in the middle
of the main street, and Hardy was immediately arrested for breach
of the peace. We obtained no relief from Judge Cox, but, for the first
time, Judge Richard Rives of the United States Court of Appeals for
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the Fifth Circuit interceded and issued an injunction pending appeal
that halted the prosecution.15
On Sunday, September 28, 1961, Bob Moses guided me through
Amite County in order to speak with several of the local black people
who had been willing to try to register. In the middle of the
afternoon, we pulled up to E.W. Steptoe’s house on a rural lane some
miles south of Liberty. The earth was red clay, the land rolling,
divided between pasture and pine trees. Mr. Steptoe said he and his
friends were having trouble encouraging black citizens to register to
vote. He identified the most important white person in the area—a
man named Hurst, a state senator who lived on neighboring land. As
boys, Steptoe and Hurst had played and fought together.
Mr. Steptoe said we should see Herbert Lee. Steptoe had not seen
the white men who had been taking down license numbers of cars
parked at the SNCC voter registration school, but he believed
Herbert Lee had seen the white men and knew who they were. Lee
lived four or five miles down a county road. We tried to see him, but
he was not there and not expected back for several hours. Because I
had an appointment in Hattiesburg the following morning, Mr. Lee’s
interview was deferred until the next trip to Mississippi. The next
day I reached Meridian in time to catch the plane to Atlanta and be
in my office in the Justice Department by 10:00 p.m. Monday,
September 29, 1961. Upon arrival, a memo from the Bureau advised
that in the morning, during an alleged dispute at the Liberty cotton
gin, Hurst had shot and killed Lee. Hurst claimed that Lee had come
at him with a tire iron.
Although the Division believed that the killing was unjustified,
we were never able to do anything about it. Lewis Allen, a local black
logging trucker, saw what had happened. The next morning he
testified under pressure to a coroner’s jury that he saw Lee with the
tire iron. At the same time he told Bob Moses he was afraid to say
what really happened. Moses inquired whether under federal law
there was a way Allen could be protected. We said no.
Within several days of Herbert Lee’s death, suits had been
prepared against the following: the sheriff of Pike County; three of
his deputies; the chief of police of McComb, Mississippi; a town
marshall; a state highway patrolman; the son of the sheriff; the
father of the deputy sheriff; and the clerk of the Chauncey Court of
Amite County for attempting to intimidate black applicants who
attempted to register or persons who had encouraged white citizens
to intimidate black applicants who attempted to register. But these
suits were never filed. The Division decided that if local law
enforcement were sued, the consequences would have been
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unpredictable and might have led to uncontrollable violence. It
surely would have expended the Division’s limited resources, and we
would have had little left for the rest of Mississippi. Burke Marshall
decided it was not the best way to break the caste system in
Mississippi. Without reservation, I agreed with him.
Instead, the Division treated the killing of Herbert Lee as a
criminal matter, but we were unable to establish the state
involvement required for federal prosecution. Several years later the
tragedy was made worse when Allen was murdered as he stepped
out of his front door in rural Amite County to see who had come to
visit him in the night. The killing of Herbert Lee and the subsequent
unsolved murder of Louis Allen remain on our consciences, not
because we could have done something about these terrible crimes,
but because there was no federal statute at the time that permitted
us to proceed with a prosecution.
During 1962 Division lawyers were constantly in the field. Lou
Kauder, Jay Goldin, Dennis Dillon, and Frank Schwelb had signed
on. The Division’s voting section had grown to perhaps fifteen
lawyers. With the help of research assistants, now referred to as
paralegals, cases were filed on a regular basis. Hearings on
preliminary injunctions were held. Although cases were lost in the
district courts, we were beginning to obtain relief from the Fifth
Circuit, even to the point of having Chief Judge Tuttle of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit assign three judges
from that court (judges John Minor Wisdom, John Brown, and
Griffin Bell) to hear a contempt trial against Theron Lynd, the
registrar of Forest County, Mississippi, for violation of an injunction
issued by that court.
While the Division pushed its county-by-county campaign, Dave
Norman conceived and planned a broader attack—state-wide
lawsuits. On December 28, 1961, the Division, on behalf of the
United States, filed an action in the Eastern District of Louisiana
against the state of Louisiana and the directors and members of the
Louisiana Board of Registration. Norman’s theory was that the
Louisiana law was in violation of federal law and the U.S.
Constitution. The Louisiana Constitution required a voter to read,
understand, and give a reasonable interpretation of any section of
either the U.S. or the Louisiana Constitution, the administration of
which rested in the uncontrolled discretion of a parish registrar.16
While proof was being developed in the Louisiana case, the
Division was preparing a similar suit against the state of
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Mississippi. On August 29, 1962, the Division filed suit on behalf of
the United States against the state of Mississippi and six county
registrars throughout the state, challenging the entire system of
registration in Mississippi on three grounds: Mississippi’s elaborate
system of registration was not being applied to most of the whites;
the system vested uncontrolled discretion in the registrar; and tests
of intelligence, understanding or comprehension in Mississippi were
unconstitutional because black citizens had not been afforded an
educational opportunity equal to that afforded white citizens.
In early September 1962 judges Wisdom, Brown, and Bell began
the contempt hearing in the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi in Hattiesburg.
For several days that September, the Division tested the voting
registration system by alternating between an unqualified white
voter and a qualified, unregistered black applicant. By unqualified, I
mean an illiterate or marginally literate applicant. At the conclusion
of that trial, the Division had proven two facts about voting in Forest
County, Mississippi: qualified black citizens were being kept off the
rolls by a variety of illegal schemes, and there was universal white
suffrage.
On July 13, 1963, the Court of Appeals judges, sitting as a trial
court in Hattiesburg, found the circuit clerk and registrar of Forest
County in contempt and ordered him to immediately register forty-
three black people, to agree not to use the application form as an
obstacle course, and to use only fourteen sections of the Mississippi
Constitution to determine an applicant’s qualifications under the
interpretation test.17
During this same time the Division lawyers were involved with
serious enforcement problems in the Mississippi Delta. SNCC had
opened an office in Greenwood, Mississippi, and was preparing to
take black applicants to the registrar’s office in groups. As soon as a
group effort began in late March 1963, the Greenwood police
interfered. At about the same time, eight SNCC registration workers
were arrested and convicted after they and about 100 local blacks
walked to the city hall to protest a shooting into the house of a black
registration worker. The eight SNCC workers, including Bob Moses
and Jim Foreman, were sentenced to four months in jail and fined
$200.
On behalf of the United States, the Division brought suit against
the city of Greenwood, the mayor, fire commissioner, police chief, city
prosecutor, and against LeFlore County, its county attorney, and a
deputy sheriff. The Division sought a temporary restraining order.
Although it was denied, we obtained agreement from the city of
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Greenwood and LeFlore County to release the SNCC workers
pending a hearing on a preliminary injunction. In June 1963 forty-
five residents of Itta Bena in LeFlore County were arrested after
they marched downtown to seek police protection because an
unknown person had released a noxious substance into a church
where a voter registration school was being held. Within a few days
of the arrest, the Division brought suit on behalf of the United States
against the local enforcement officials.
The suits presented difficult assignments before a difficult federal
district judge, Judge Claude Clayton of the Northern District of
Mississippi. SNCC’s increased pressure against the caste system
caused the suits, but the suits afforded no answer.
On March 9, 1963, the Louisiana state-wide suit came up for trial.
A massive amount of evidence was stipulated into the record and the
court adjourned to reach its decision. Meanwhile, discovery was
getting underway in the Mississippi state-wide suit. The state of
Mississippi had served the Division with massive interrogatories
that inquired into the factual underpinnings of each and every
allegation of the government’s complaint.
Sometime in April 1963 while Bob Owen and I were together in a
motel somewhere in the Delta, we talked about how we were going to
respond to those interrogatories. We decided to answer them in
monumental detail, with information from most of Mississippi’s
eighty-two counties. We mobilized the Division’s lawyers, research
assistants, and secretaries, and enlisted a cadre of summer interns.
We pushed them to their limits and beyond, regardless of cost,
regardless of casualties. Bob Owen, however, demanded and
delivered more of himself than he ever asked of anyone who worked
with him.
On August 31, 1963, the Division served the United States’
answers to the state of Mississippi’s interrogatories. In the history of
complex litigation, these interrogatory answers set a standard for
responses to burdensome interrogatories calling for massive
amounts of detailed information. The answers drew upon and
organized the collective hard work of a small number of Division
lawyers who had labored in the field for two and one-half years.
The answers covered the factual basis to support the United
States’ claim for relief and were contained in seven volumes. The
first contained the name, race, education, and other background
information of each person contacted in connection with the case.
The second covered state-wide registration statistics by county and
by race on six specific dates between 1890 to 1962. The third
contained the factual basis showing the racially discriminatory
purpose of the registration laws under attack, white primary
practices in Mississippi, and the decrease in black registration since
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1890. The fourth contained the facts that showed that, in
Mississippi, public education provided for black persons was inferior
to public education provided for white persons. The fifth detailed
how white political supremacy was established and maintained in
Mississippi prior to 1955 when the constitutional interpretation test
was adopted. Volumes six and seven included, by county, factual
data since 1955 showing a lack of uniform administration of the
voting laws, favored treatment of whites, and unlimited discretion
vested in the registrars.
Throughout these years, the Division faced resistance in trying
the voting rights cases before certain United States district judges.
United States v. Mississippi18 is a prime example.
On October 12, 1963, I wrote judges Cameron, Brown, and Cox,
who were assigned the case, to request a firm trial date in the near
future. I provided the court with a chronological history of the case to
that date. The letter urged the court to give the case immediate
attention. It reminded the court that Judge Richard Rives of the
Fifth Circuit had recently stated that “[t]he right to vote is one of the
most important and powerful privileges that our democratic form of
government has to offer.”19
It did not take long for Judge Harold Cox to reply:
Dear Mr. Doar:
I have a copy of your letter of October 12 regarding the above
case and thought I had made it clear to you one time in
Hattiesburg that I was not in the least impressed with your
impudence in reciting the chronology of the case before me with
which I am completely familiar. If you need to build such
transcripts for your boss man, you had better do that by interoffice
memoranda because I am not favorably impressed with you or your
tactics in undertaking to push one of your cases before me. I spend
most of my time in fooling with lousy cases brought before me by
your department in the civil rights field, and I do not intend to
turn my docket over to your department for your political
advancement. You have been given every consideration and every
courtesy in my court, and I don’t think that you have any sense of
gratitude or appreciation therefor. You are completely stupid if you
do not fully realize that each of the judges in this court
understands the importance of this case to all of the litigants. I do
not intend to be hurried or harassed by you or any of your
underlings in this or any court where I sit and the sooner you get
that through your head the better you will get along with me, if
that is of any interest to you. I do not think that the very
important actions in this case should be shelved just because you
are in a hurry to make some kind of showing in your docket, and I
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shall not vote for any such irregular and completely improper
procedure simply for the advancement of your political goals.20
On March 6, 1964, the court ruled in this case and the United
States lost. Judge Cameron, writing for the majority, labeled the
government case a frontal attack by the “‘Indestructible Union’
member of the partnership . . . upon the other member, the
‘Indestructible State.’”21 The court dismissed the complaint without
holding a trial.22 Judge Brown, in his dissent, observed that while
“the tone of indestructibility is good,” history teaches that no
political institution is indestructible.23 He insisted that if a political
institution were to survive, it must save itself from destruction, and
that the peril of destruction was what the case was all about.24
Judge Brown labeled the contest as between all citizens of the
United States and the State.25 He clearly explained the government’s
theory.
The underlying Mississippi constitutional provisions and the
implementing statutory law regulating registration of voters came
into being—and are currently maintained—out of a purpose by the
organized State to deny Negroes the right to vote by contriving a
structure having the appearance of legality, but having known,
built-in devices which would, and did, effectually deny or
overwhelmingly discourage the Negroes’ effort toward full
citizenship.26
He insisted that “[t]he immediate means—the understanding test—
must be judged, both in its purpose and in its effect,” in light of
Mississippi’s policy of segregated “education and the wide disparity
in the quality and quantity of education afforded by Mississippi to its
white and Negro children.”27
On November 27, 1963, Judge Wisdom handed down the Court’s
opinion in United States v. Louisiana.28 The court declared the
Louisiana statute and laws respecting its interpretation test
unconstitutional, and froze the standard in those parishes where the
test had been applied.29
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Judge Wisdom held that a wall stood in Louisiana between
registered voters and unregistered eligible black voters, and that the
wall must come down.30
Judge Wisdom explained how the registrar selects the
constitutional section and must be satisfied with the explanation.31
He pointed out that “[i]n many parishes the registrar is not easily
satisfied with constitutional interpretation from Negro applicants.”32
The court held that, considered in its historical setting and its actual
operation and inescapable effect, this law was a sophisticated
scheme to disfranchise black people.33 Judge Wisdom rejected apathy
as a reason for the low registration of black people.34 Apathy is, he
said, “an unctuous and self-excusing word” used to rationalize the
small black registration.35
Judge Wisdom’s opinion and Judge Brown’s dissent should be
required reading in senior high school or college level American
history courses in every school in the country.
Aside from these two state-wide cases, by the end of 1963 the
Division had filed thirty-four suits against county registrars for
discrimination in voter registration and had forty-eight other
counties under investigation. It had filed twelve suits seeking
injunctions against intimidation, with another eight under
investigation. It had examined the voter registration records in
twenty-seven counties in Alabama, fifty counties in Mississippi, and
twenty-seven counties in Louisiana. In 1964 that pace continued,
even though SNCC’s program in Mississippi for Freedom Summer
and the murders in Neshoba County in June 1964 forced the
Division to revise its priorities.
This brings me to Selma, Dallas County, Alabama, which became
the turning point in the battle for voting rights. The Division had
first gone to Selma in February 1961. At that time, a local
organization of blacks were trying to break down the barrier to
voting. Several months later Burke Marshall and Robert Kennedy
authorized the Division to file its first voting case against the
registrars of Dallas County. The next year SNCC opened a field
office in Selma. During the next four years Division attorneys spent
more time in Dallas County than in any other county in the south.
Late in 1964 Dr. King and his Southern Christian Leadership
Conference organization (SCLC) came to Selma. Out of a
convergence of the forces of SNCC, SCLC, and the Division, each
                                                                                                                   
30. See id. at 356.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 359-60 n.8.
35. Id.
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having challenged the caste system in its own way, came a series of
events that culminated at the Selma bridge where mounted state
police dispersed, with clubs and tear gas, a number of blacks on their
way to the state capitol in Montgomery to present their grievances to
the governor. After that episode the Voting Rights Act of 196536
quickly followed.
On March 18 a bill entitled The Voting Rights Act of 196537 was
introduced. On the same day Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach
appeared before the House Judiciary Committee to testify in detail
about the bill. He spelled out how the registration process in the
south had been perverted to test “not literacy, not ability, not
understanding-but race.”38
Katzenbach told the Committee members that three times since
1956 Congress adopted litigation in the federal courts as the solution
to this problem. He complained of the inadequacy of the judicial
process and described it as “tarnished by evasion, obstruction, delay,
and disrespect.”39 He cited example after example, and he proposed a
new approach to the Committee.
No one in the Division quarreled with the need for a new
approach, nor with the frustrations because of judicial delay and
obfuscation. But cries of frustration do not move mountains. The
Division’s hard work underpinned the opinions and orders of federal
judges Tuttle of Georgia, Rives and Johnson of Alabama, Wisdom of
Louisiana, and Brown of Texas—opinions and orders that
established the freezing principal;40 that stayed a state criminal
prosecution of an SNCC voter registration worker;41 that caused a
real contempt trial to be held in Mississippi;42 and that led to Judge
Wisdom’s and Judge Brown’s penetrating and persuasive findings as
to the purpose and the effect of Louisiana’s43 and Mississippi’s44
constitutional and statutory requirements for voting. These decisions
had an influence on individual members of the House Judiciary
                                                                                                                   
36. See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1994)).
37. See H.R. 6400, 89th Cong. (1965); see also S. 1564, 89th Cong. (1965) (enacted
with amendments to include language from House bill).
38. Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. Number 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 5 (1965) (statement of Nicholas B. Katzenbach, U.S.
Attorney General).
39. Id.
40. See United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala. 1961), aff’d, 304 F.2d
583 (5th Cir. 1962), aff’d per curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
41. See United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961).
42. See United States v. Lynd, 349 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1965).
43. See United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), aff’d, 380 U.S.
145 (1965).
44. See United States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1964), rev’d, 380
U.S. 128 (1965).
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Committee as they decided upon the final content of the 1965 Voting
Rights Bill, and on individual members of Congress to vote to pass
the Voting Rights Bill.
By August 6, 1965, Congress acted, and the President signed the
legislation.45 In acting, Congress added a very important provision to
the bill. Congress provided that in every county where federal
examiners had been assigned, the Attorney General might assign
federal observers to any polling place within the county to see that
all persons entitled to vote were permitted to vote and would have
their votes properly counted.46
On the day of the signing ceremony, President Johnson said he
was directing the Attorney General to immediately file a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of the poll tax in the state of
Mississippi. He also requested the Department of Justice to work all
through that weekend so that on Monday morning next, it could
designate ten to fifteen counties where federal examiners would be
at work registering qualified voters on the following day. He also
promised that by the following Tuesday, additional poll tax suits
would be filed in the states of Texas, Alabama, and Virginia. The
Division met the President’s commitment.
On the Monday following the passage of the Voting Rights Act,
the Civil Service Commission announced that registration offices
would open in nine counties in three states. On the first day of
opening, these offices registered 1144 blacks. By the first of the year,
federal officials operating in thirty-six counties had registered
79,815 blacks. During the same period, local officials in the five
states of the deep south registered 215,000 blacks.
This compliance did not occur by chance. On the day following the
passage of the Act, Attorney General Katzenbach sent letters
prepared by the Division to the 650 registration officials. He
explained the provisions of the statute and said he would appoint
examiners when it was clear that past denials of the right to vote
justified it, or where present compliance with federal law was
insufficient to assure prompt registration of all eligible citizens.
Following the passage of the Act, FBI agents checked, on a weekly
basis, voter registration books in every county in a five-state area.
Young attorneys in the Division spent their days in rural southern
counties explaining the law to local officials and to black citizens,
and to bringing situations of noncompliance to the attention of the
Attorney General.
                                                                                                                   
45. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1994)).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(f) (1994).
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On March 7, 1966, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
Voting Rights Act.47
On May 3, 1966, the first post-Voting Rights Act primary election
arrived. Dallas County, Alabama, was the test county. The key race
was for sheriff. The contestants were Jim Clark, the segregationist
sheriff, and Wilson Baker, the sensible, moderate police chief of the
city of Selma.
I was in Selma that day. Election day in Selma was a beautiful
day. Within fifteen minutes after the polls opened, you could sense a
movement of black people toward the polls. Near the federal
courthouse in Selma, black men and women could be seen walking to
the polls. By 8:15 a.m. in the public housing area where the Selma
march began, there was a line outside the polling place of at least
350 black people. For most it was the first time in their lives that
they participated in the democratic selection of public officials.
Across town in another black neighborhood, where the streets
were unpaved and the houses unpainted, there was the same
movement of people toward the polls.
The little town of Orville in rural Dallas County, some eighteen
miles from Selma, a town consisting of a closed bank, a post office, a
general store, a drug store, a town hall, and a machine shop or two,
also had four polling places. By 9:30, the streets around the polling
places were filled with blacks. These were rural people. None had
ever voted before. More than 500 of 700 registered blacks deposited
their votes into four voting boxes.
That night the Dallas County returns came in very slowly. The
largest number of citizens in Dallas County’s history had appeared
at the polls to vote, leading to long lines at every polling place,
especially in predominantly black areas. The ballot contained
seventy-three candidates competing for twenty-four different
nominations. The clerks had to count each contest on each paper
ballot. The race for sheriff was very close. The lead switched back
and forth. First, Jim Clark was ahead, then Wilson Baker.
By three or four o’clock in the morning, six boxes containing more
than 1672 black and 162 white votes remained unreported. At that
time Clark held a small lead. The local probate judge sent
“replacement clerks” to finish the count. These clerks were white and
were part of the Clark Machine. The Justice Department
immediately sent federal observers to observe the “replacement
clerks.” Before the count was finished, the county judge decided to
impound the six boxes.
A few hours later the Dallas County Democratic Executive
Committee decided to have white CPAs count the ballots in the six
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boxes. This went on at the county courthouse throughout the day
and the next night, with federal observers in each room observing
this second count. The result in the six boxes—Baker, 1412; Clark,
92—determined the result of the election. However, the Dallas
County Democratic Executive Committee, consisting of forty lily-
white men, immediately rejected all the votes in the six boxes.
The Division was determined that the black citizens of Dallas
County not be disillusioned with their first actual participation in a
local election. That afternoon the United States filed a federal court
action seeking an injunction against the wholesale rejection of the
ballots of registered voters. Judge Frank Johnson immediately
ordered that no ballots be destroyed. From that time until the
federal court decided the case twenty days later, federal observers
guarded the boxes.
In preparation for the hearing, lawyers and research assistants
analyzed all of the ballots for that election—17,440 ballots. Within
eight days they were ready to advise the federal court about the
mechanics and operation of that election, including a complete
analysis of each poll list, tally sheet, certificate of result, and, where
necessary, each ballot.
After hearing testimony for two days, the federal court concluded
there was no evidence to indicate that votes were bought or sold, or
that the boxes were stuffed. Thus, Jim Clark was defeated and
Wilson Baker was elected Dallas County sheriff.48
Before that time in Dallas County, Alabama, about 6500 persons
usually voted in key elections. That year, 17,440 voted in the first
primary and 15,717 in the November election.
On the day of that election in Selma, over 500 federal observers
were in Dallas County—observers from New York, Milwaukee,
Denver, and San Francisco. They were civil servants sent to the
various polling places in Dallas County to observe and insure that
the elections were properly held. The Division’s lawyers managed
the movement of federal observers.
Today my career as a lawyer is almost over. As I call upon myself
to account, more and more, my memory goes back to those days and
years with the Division, working for the United States, enforcing its
fundamental law, and the roll call of the Division lawyers, the Civil
Rights Division lawyers, keeps ringing in my ears.49
                                                                                                                   
48. See United States v. Executive Comm. of the Dem. Party of Dallas County, Ala.,
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49. Hubbard, Maceo W. ...........1946-78 Schwelb, Frank ................. 1962-79
Barrett, St. John................1955-67 Rosenberg, John................ 1962-70
Norman, David ..................1957-73 Ross, Alexander.........1962-present
Greene, Harold ..................1958-65 McIntyre, Kenneth............ 1963-67
Owen, D. Robert ................1958-69 Lyon, John......................... 1963-68
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Flannery, J. Harold ...........1958-70 Moore, Robert.................... 1963-88
Dunbaugh, Frank ..............1958-78 Sutin, Jonathon................. 1964-65
Tyler, Harold .....................1960-61 Landsberg, Brian .............. 1964-86
Doar, John .........................1960-67 Glick, Martin..................... 1964-66
Groh, Rupert......................1960-63 McCabe, William............... 1964-67
Marshall, Burke.................1961-65 Nixon, John ....................... 1964-69
Sather, Arvid A..................1961-64 Fleischer, Hugh................. 1964-71
Stern, Gerald .....................1961-64 Turner, James................... 1965-93
Golden, Harrison ...............1961-63 Nesson, Charles ................ 1965-66
Gordon, Martin..................1961-63 Pollak, Steve ..................... 1965-67
Parson, Dick.......................1961-66 Livingston, Gene ............... 1965-68
Gabel, Carl.........................1961-88 Bingler, John H................. 1965-67
Martin, John......................1962-64 Fiss, Owen......................... 1966-68
Dillon, Denis ......................1962-63 Allen, Frank ...................... 1966-88
Henderson, Thelton ...........1962-63 Kirby, John J..................... 1967-68
Kauder, Louis ....................1962-67 Barnett, Walter................. 1967-87
